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PROVIDING FAIR RELIEF IN GEORGIA 
DISPOSSESSORY PROCEEDINGS 
Zack S. Thompson* 
INTRODUCTION 
In August 2014, Fulton County Superior Court granted the new 
owner of 477 Peachtree Street in downtown Atlanta the ability to 
begin evicting the tenant homeless shelter that had occupied the 
property for eighteen years.1 The largest shelter space in the 
southeastern United States, the Peachtree-Pine shelter provided 
services to an average of 700 men, women, and children daily, with 
as many as 650 sleeping there each night.2 The shelter contended that 
the shelter’s new landlord had gained title improperly by—fraud and 
collusion among a number of other acts—purchasing a note attached 
to the property; working to cut off the shelter’s private funding and 
thus its ability to pay its rent, bills, and loan; and subsequently 
purchasing the property at foreclosure.3 Though the shelter stated 
valid claims for trial, claims such as wrongful foreclosure are not 
available defenses to a dispossessory proceeding.4 For other reasons, 
                                                                                                                 
 * J.D. Candidate, 2016, Georgia State University College of Law. Special thanks to the Hon. Craig 
Schwall, Rupal Romero, Professor Ryan Rowberry, and the Georgia State University Law Review. 
 1. Rhonda Cook, Owners Can Begin Peachtree and Pine Shelter Eviction Process, ATLANTA J. 
CONST. (Aug. 8, 2014, 9:01 PM), http://www.ajc.com/news/news/owners-can-begin-peachtree-and-pine-
shelter-evicti/ngyFd/; Mission & History, METRO ATLANTA TASK FORCE FOR HOMELESS, 
http://atlantataskforceforhomeless.org/our-mission-history/ (last visited Mar. 25, 2016) (“In November 
of 1996 our current facility, located on the corner of Peachtree and Pine Streets, was purchased by a 
generous donor and immediately deeded over to the Task Force.”). 
 2. Cook, supra note 1 (“As many as 650 men, women and children sleep at the shelter each night 
but there are far more when the weather is bad or it’s cold.”); Mission & History, supra note 1 (“This 
95,000 sq. ft. facility is the largest shelter space in the southeastern United States, providing shelter and 
services to an average of 500–700 men, women, and children on a daily basis.”). 
 3. Terry Carter, Battle of Atlanta: Fight over a Downtown Homeless Shelter Strains Some Down-
Home Ties, ABA J. (May 1, 2011, 9:50 AM), http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/ 
battle_of_atlanta_fight_over_a_downtown_homeless_shelter_strains; Cook, supra note 1. See also 
Special Master’s Order on Defendants’ Motions for Summary Judgment at 3–29, Ichthus Cmty. Trust v. 
Metro Atlanta Task Force for the Homeless, Inc., Civil Action No. 2010-CV-185971 (Super. Ct. Fulton 
Cty. 2014). 
 4. Greg Land, Judge Says Landlord May File to Evict Task Force Shelter, FULTON COUNTY DAILY 
REPORT (Aug. 12, 2014), http://www.dailyreportonline.com/id=1202666485342/Judge-Says-Landlord-
1
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the Georgia Court of Appeals reversed the dispossessory ruling and 
effectuated a stay until the trial court resolved the issue of title.5 
However, the shelter’s financial straits also affected its ability to pay 
rent pending adjudication.6 The shelter was therefore unable to retain 
legal possession while adjudicating its claims.7 
In contrast, Laura Westray, writing about the dangers of overly 
burdensome eviction requirements, describes Lena Schnuck, an 
eighty-nine-year-old owner of an eight-unit apartment building.8 
Lena, after suffering a stroke, was unable to evict a tenant without 
enduring “costly and time consuming court preparations” while 
waiting for the required trial.9 In reality, heartless slumlords are rare; 
“the great majority of owners are merely attempting to earn a 
reasonable return on their investments by providing a vital service to 
our society.”10 Most landlords, like Lena, seek eviction in good 
faith.11 
Summary eviction processes must provide a swift, narrow avenue 
through which property owners may evict tenants at sufferance 
without turning to self-help or a full civil suit.12 However, such an 
                                                                                                                 
May-File-to-Evict-Task-Force-Shelter?slreturn=20160209150040 (noting that on motions for summary 
judgment, “the court-appointed special master . . . dismissed the Task Force’s racketeering and libel 
claims, but kept alive other claims, including those for tortious interference with the shelter’s lenders 
and wrongful foreclosure”). 
 5. Metro Atlanta Task Force for the Homeless, Inc. v. Premium Funding Solutions, LLC, 741 
S.E.2d 225 (Ga. Ct. App. 2013). The case was again appealed and heard by the Georgia Supreme Court 
in 2015, but the court dismissed the dispossessory issue as moot because “the Task Force has 
successfully obtained a remedy at law for the dispossessory action . . . .” Metro Atlanta Task Force for 
the Homeless, Inc. v. Ichthus Cmty. Trust, 780 S.E.2d 311, 317 (Ga. 2015). 
 6. Greg Land, Homeless Shelter Asks Judge to Reconsider Order on Rent, FULTON COUNTY DAILY 
REPORT (Aug. 14, 2014), http://www.dailyreportonline.com/id=1202666880558/Homeless-Shelter-
Asks-Judge-to-Reconsider-Order-on-Rent (“Since the Task Force is unable to pay any ‘substantive 
rent,’ [Task Force’s attorney] wrote, it will inevitably be forced out . . . .”). 
 7. Land, supra note 4. 
 8. Laura L. Westray, Note, Are Landlords Being Taken by the Good Cause Eviction Requirement?, 
62 S. CAL. L. REV. 321, 321 (1988). 
 9. Id. at 321–22. 
 10. Randy G. Gerchick, Comment, No Easy Way Out: Making the Summary Eviction Process a 
Fairer and More Efficient Alternative to Landlord Self-Help, 41 UCLA L. REV. 759, 767 (1994) 
(quoting Laura L. Westray, Note, Are Landlords Being Taken by the Good Cause Eviction 
Requirement?, 62 S. CAL. L. REV. 321, 321 (1988)). 
 11. Lauren A. Lindsey, Comment, Protecting the Good-Faith Tenant: Enforcing Retaliatory 
Eviction Laws By Broadening the Residential Tenant’s Options in Summary Eviction Courts, 63 OKLA. 
L. REV. 101, 102 (2010). 
 12. Mary B. Spector, Tenant Stories: Obstacles and Challenges Facing Tenants Today, 40 J. 
2
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action inherently struggles to provide parties with full legal redress, 
especially considering property’s uniquely equitable attributes.13 
Georgia’s dispossessory actions are no different, limiting both 
parties’ range of options in the interest of providing a speedy 
alternative to self-help or other improper eviction procedures.14 
This Note argues for a Georgia dispossessory action scheme that, 
when necessary, is both broader for defendants and quicker for 
plaintiffs. Part I examines the current state of dispossessory actions in 
Georgia.15 Part II provides a critical analysis of Georgia’s 
dispossessory action scheme, particularly regarding defendants’ 
available defenses and rent requirements16 and plaintiffs’ access to 
timely remedies.17 Finally, Part III proposes solutions that (1) better 
equip defendants to legitimately challenge dispossessory actions and 
(2) provide property owners with appropriately swifter remedies.18 
I.   BACKGROUND 
Tenancies at sufferance occur most often when a tenant or property 
owner does not vacate a property after losing possessory rights to the 
property by way of a terminated lease or foreclosure.19 Summary 
                                                                                                                 
MARSHALL L. REV. 407, 410 (2007). “Though details may differ, in general, the summary eviction 
proceeding is one that provides an alternative to the landlord’s exercise of self-help by providing the 
landlord with a fast, effective way to regain possession of the premises after the tenant has breached a 
lease.” Id. 
 13. Id. at 410–11 (“Despite the problems that restrictions on time and triable issues may pose for 
tenants, those restrictions are the basis for the view that the summary eviction proceeding is a 
convenient, safe, and relatively speedy alternative to self-help.”); Gerchick, supra note 10, at 769 
(discussing eviction’s potential damage to tenants, including “many tenants for whom an eviction would 
result in homelessness, particularly among those that live in rent control or low-income housing and that 
would not be able to locate similarly priced housing upon eviction”). 
 14. WILLIAM J. DAWKINS, GA. LANDLORD & TENANT: BREACH & REMEDIES § 5-1 (4th ed. 2007) 
(“Self-help evictions by landlords without resort to [dispossessory proceedings] . . . constitute actionable 
torts, even if the tenant is holding over . . . . Such forcible action by the landlord may amount to a 
trespass or other actionable tort for which damages, including punitive damages, may lie.”). 
 15. See discussion infra Part I. 
 16. See discussion infra Part II.A. 
 17. See discussion infra Part II.B. 
 18. See discussion infra Part III. 
 19. Bellamy v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., 512 S.E.2d 671, 675 (Ga. Ct. App. 1999) (“Where former 
owners of real property remain in possession after a foreclosure sale, they become tenants at 
sufferance.”); 2 DANIEL F. HINKEL, PINDAR’S GEORGIA REAL ESTATE LAW AND PROCEDURE WITH 
FORMS § 11:42 (7th ed. 2013) (“[A] tenant by sufferance is a wrong-doer who is in possession without 
3
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proceedings to obtain possession from a tenant at sufferance exist in 
all states.20 States name these actions by a current property owner 
against a tenant at sufferance differently; labels include “summary 
process,” “summary dispossession,” and “forcible entry and 
detainer.”21 Georgia denotes such actions with the term 
“dispossessory.”22 Dispossessory actions nationwide provide 
property owners with streamlined title determination, often producing 
results more quickly than other adjudicative processes.23 Georgia’s 
dispossessory proceeding is similarly streamlined compared to other 
civil proceedings.24 
O.C.G.A. §§ 44-7-49 to -59 exclusively control dispossessory 
action procedure in Georgia.25 Property owners seek, through 
dispossessory proceedings, a “writ of possession,” which the court 
may issue to give the property owner unconditioned and unrestricted 
possession of the property.26 After initially demanding possession of 
the property from a tenant at sufferance, property owners may 
                                                                                                                 
the landlord’s consent, although his original entry may have been lawful.”). 
 20. Mary B. Spector, Tenants’ Rights, Procedural Wrongs: The Summary Eviction and the Need for 
Reform, 46 WAYNE L. REV. 135, 137 (2000) (“A summary proceeding for eviction exists in every 
state.”). 
 21. Id. (noting examples of summary proceedings’ “different labels-summary process, summary 
dispossession, or forcible entry and detainer”). 
 22. Howard v. GMAC Mortg., LLC, 739 S.E.2d 453, 454 (Ga. Ct. App. 2013) (“In this 
dispossessory action . . . GMAC filed a dispossessory warrant against Howard in Cherokee County 
State Court, asserting that he was a tenant at sufferance as a result of GMAC’s purchase of the property 
at a May, 2010 foreclosure sale.” (emphasis added)); Williams v. Clayton Park Mobile Home Court, 
Inc., 304 S.E.2d 483, 484 (Ga. Ct. App. 1983) (“On September 2, 1982, this dispossessory proceeding 
was instituted.” (emphasis added)). 
 23. O.C.G.A. § 44-7-53(b) (2010) (“Every effort should be made by the trial court to expedite a trial 
of the issues.”). This expedition parallels other states’ procedures. Spector, supra note 20, at 137 (“[A] 
basic feature of the proceeding is its limited nature. Generally only a single issue is presented: Who is 
entitled to possession? The question is usually answered within six to ten days after the action is 
commenced.”). 
 24. 1979 Ga. Op. Atty. Gen. U79-7 (1979) (“[A] dispossessory proceeding is not a civil action but 
[is] merely a summary process setting forth the procedure for the disposition of the property pending 
trial of any contested issues.”). 
 25. Ralls v. E.R. Taylor Auto Co., 42 S.E.2d 446, 447 (Ga. 1947). Summary proceedings provided in 
the Georgia code, currently O.C.G.A., Art. 3, Ch. 7, T. 44, are “the only lawful manner by which a 
tenant may be summarily and forcibly evicted.” Id. “Since a dispossessory proceeding is not a civil suit, 
[O.C.G.A. § 15-10-43] and the remaining provisions relative to the filing of a civil suit before a justice 
of the peace do not apply to dispossessory proceedings.” 1979 Ga. Op. Atty. Gen. U79-7 (1979). 
 26. O.C.G.A. § 44-7-49 (2010). “‘[W]rit of possession’ means a writ issued to recover the 
possession of land or other property and such writ shall not contain restrictions, responsibilities, or 
conditions upon the landlord in order to be placed in full possession of the land or other property.” Id. 
4
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immediately make an affidavit of the facts if the tenant at sufferance 
“refuses or fails to deliver possession when so demanded.”27 A copy 
of a summons and the affidavit is then “personally served upon the 
defendant.”28 Within seven days from the date of service, the 
defendant may answer with “any legal or equitable defense or 
counterclaim.”29 The court may enter a default judgment if the 
defendant does not answer.30 If the dispossessory action is for 
nonpayment of rent, a defendant’s tender of “all rents allegedly owed 
plus the cost of the dispossessory warrant” is a complete defense.31 If 
the defendant does answer, a trial of the issues ensues.32 If the 
property owner prevails, the court issues a writ of possession, 
“effective at the expiration of seven days after the date such 
judgment was entered,” that authorizes “the removal of the tenant or 
his or her personal property or both from the premises.”33 If the 
                                                                                                                 
 27. O.C.G.A. § 44-7-50(a) (2010). “[A] proper demand for possession is a condition precedent to the 
right of a landlord to dispossess.” Whipper v. Kirk, 274 S.E.2d 662, 664 (Ga. Ct. App. 1980). 
 28. O.C.G.A. § 44-7-51(a) (2010) (“A copy of the summons and a copy of the affidavit shall be 
personally served upon the defendant.”). 
 29. O.C.G.A. § 44-7-51(b) (2010). “A tenant has an unqualified right to submit an answer and a 
counterclaim in all dispossessory proceedings.” Moran v. Mid-State Homes, Inc., 320 S.E.2d 625, 626 
(Ga. Ct. App. 1984). 
 30. O.C.G.A. § 44-7-51(c), -53(a) (2010). The default judgment may only grant a writ of possession, 
not money owed, for which the court may only grant judgment if “the defendant files an answer or 
otherwise makes an appearance in the case.” O.C.G.A. § 44-7-51(c). 
 31. O.C.G.A. § 44-7-52 (2010). However, “a landlord is required to accept such a tender from any 
individual tenant after the issuance of a dispossessory summons only once in any 12 month period.” Id. 
 32. O.C.G.A. § 44-7-53(b) (2010). 
If the tenant answers, a trial of the issues shall be had in accordance with the 
procedure prescribed for civil actions in courts of record except that if the action 
is tried in the magistrate court the trial shall be had in accordance with the 
procedures prescribed for that court. 
Id. 
 33. O.C.G.A. § 44-7-55 (2010). 
If, on the trial of the case, the judgment is against the tenant, judgment shall be 
entered against the tenant for all rents due and for any other claim relating to the 
dispute. The court shall issue a writ of possession, both of execution for the 
judgment amount and a writ to be effective at the expiration of seven days after 
the date such judgment was entered . . . . Any writ of possession issued pursuant 
to this article shall authorize the removal of the tenant or his or her personal 
property or both from the premises and permit the placement of such personal 
property on some portion of the landlord’s property or on other property as may 
be designated by the landlord and as may be approved by the executing officer; 
provided, however, that the landlord shall not be a bailee of such personal 
property and shall owe no duty to the tenant regarding such personal property. 
After execution of the writ, such property shall be regarded as abandoned. 
5
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tenant prevails, “he shall be entitled to remain in the premises and the 
landlord shall be liable for all foreseeable damages shown to have 
been caused by his wrongful conduct.”34 
Georgia has established narrow avenues through which a tenant at 
sufferance may defend against a dispossessory action, particularly 
post-foreclosure.35 In fact, Georgia courts have recognized only one 
appropriate rebuttal to dispossessory actions: a fundamental lack of 
landlord-tenant relationship.36 A defendant may prove the lack of a 
landlord-tenant relationship by presenting fraudulent deeds or other 
evidence that the plaintiff does not actually own the property.37 
Georgia courts distinguish these challenges from those that attack the 
means by which the plaintiff obtained ownership of the property, 
such as wrongful foreclosure.38 Defendants are left to address the 
                                                                                                                 
Id. 
 34. O.C.G.A. § 44-7-55. 
If the judgment is for the tenant, he shall be entitled to remain in the premises and 
the landlord shall be liable for all foreseeable damages shown to have been 
caused by his wrongful conduct. Any funds remaining in the registry of the court 
shall be distributed to the parties in accordance with the judgment of the court. 
Id. 
 35. E.g., Howard v. GMAC Mortg., LLC, 739 S.E.2d 453, 455 (Ga. Ct. App. 2013) (“[A]lleged 
invalidity of a foreclosure sale cannot be asserted as a defense in a subsequent dispossessory 
proceeding.”); Bellamy v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., 512 S.E.2d 671, 674 (Ga. Ct. App. 1999) (“It is not 
germane to a dispossessory proceeding to allege ‘that a contract under which the plaintiff claims to 
derive title from the defendant is void and should be canceled.’” (quoting Womack v. Columbus 
Rentals, Inc., 478 S.E.2d 611, 614–15 (Ga. Ct. App. 1996))); McKinney v. S. Boston Savings Bank, 274 
S.E.2d 34, 35 (Ga. Ct. App. 1980) (“The purchaser at a foreclosure sale . . . is the sole owner of the 
property until and unless the sale is set aside.”). 
 36. Egana v. HSBC Mortg. Corp., 669 S.E.2d 159, 161 (Ga. Ct. App. 2008). This case involved an 
allegedly fraudulent security deed. Id. The Georgia Court of Appeals distinguished between defendants 
challenging plaintiff’s ownership of the property—and therefore the landlord-tenant relationship itself—
and defendants claiming defects in the landlord’s title. Id. 
 37. E.g., Patrick v. Cobb, 49 S.E. 806 (Ga. 1905) (plaintiff allegedly did not present sufficient 
evidence to establish the existence of a tenancy); Egana, 669 S.E.2d at 160–61 (allegedly fraudulent 
security deed); Wilbanks v. Arthur, 570 S.E.2d 664 (Ga. Ct. App. 2002) (defendant’s mother allegedly 
acquired title from plaintiff through adverse possession, and defendant lived on the property with 
mother’s permission); Sanders v. Hughes, 359 S.E.2d 396 (Ga. Ct. App. 1987) (document between the 
parties was allegedly a sales contract, not a lease). 
 38. E.g., Crawford v. Crawford, 77 S.E. 557 (Ga. 1913) (written contract under which the plaintiff 
claimed to derive title allegedly obtained by fraud, and therefore void); Sanders v. Daniel, 691 S.E.2d 
244 (Ga. Ct. App. 2010) (landlord’s title allegedly invalid because the company from which he bought 
the property had obtained an order quieting title from a court lacking subject matter jurisdiction); 
Bellamy, 512 S.E.2d at 674 (foreclosure sale allegedly invalid due to failure of notice, failure to comply 
with the security deed exercise of power sale, and other defects). 
6
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latter in separate actions, although these counterclaims are still 
considered compulsory and carry the risk of claim preclusion.39 
In short, a defendant may assert that a plaintiff does not own the 
property and may retain possession while adjudicating that issue.40 
However, defendants are left to assert that plaintiffs should not own 
the property in a separate action after losing possession of the 
property.41 This dichotomy applies even where a counterclaim like 
wrongful foreclosure, if valid, would place the defendant in 
possession of the property and therefore abolish the defendant’s 
status as a tenant at sufferance.42 
Additionally, even when a defendant presents an appropriate 
defense, Georgia law requires that the defendant pay rent into the 
court registry pending resolution or automatically lose the 
dispossessory action and possession of the property.43 Likewise, 
                                                                                                                 
 39. Sanders, 691 S.E.2d at 246 (“[W]hile [defendant is] free to challenge [plaintiff’s] title in a 
separate action, she could not raise the alleged defect as a defense to [plaintiff’s] dispossessory 
action.”); Bellamy, 512 S.E.2d at 674 (“[A]ny defect in the advertising of the foreclosure, conduct of 
sale, deed under power of sale, or other basis to set aside the foreclosure had to be asserted as a 
compulsory counterclaim or it becomes barred by res judicata.”); Trust Co. Bank of Nw. Ga. v. Shaw, 
355 S.E.2d 99, 101 (Ga. Ct. App. 1987) (holding that res judicata barred a prior dispossessory defendant 
from instituting a tort action for damages stemming from landlord’s failure to maintain premises 
because the dispossessory proceeding satisfied res judicata’s “same transaction” test); Moran v. Mid-
State Homes, Inc., 320 S.E.2d 625, 626 (Ga. Ct. App. 1984) (holding that the trial court erred in 
dismissing a counterclaim where defendant lost the dispossessory claim because a “tenant has an 
unqualified right to submit an answer and a counterclaim in all dispossessory proceedings. Failure to 
pay rent into the registry of the court pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 44-7-54 affects only the right to possession 
of the premises, not the right to pursue a counterclaim.”). 
 40. Thomas v. Wells Fargo Credit Corp., 409 S.E.2d 71, 72 (Ga. Ct. App. 1991) (“Defendants’ claim 
that they own the premises is relevant only to the extent that it challenges the allegations that plaintiff 
owns the premises and that defendants are tenants at sufferance, i.e., that plaintiff is a landlord with right 
of immediate possession.”). 
 41. Womack v. Columbus Rentals, Inc., 478 S.E.2d 611, 614–15 (Ga. Ct. App. 1996). 
The purchaser at a foreclosure sale under a power of sale in a security deed is the 
sole owner of the property until and unless the sale is set aside. It is not germane 
to a dispossessory proceeding to allege ‘that a contract under which the plaintiff 
claims to derive title from the defendant is void and should be canceled’ . . . . A 
tenant can not dispute the title of his landlord. 
Id. (quoting McKinney v. S. Boston Savings Bank, 274 S.E.2d 34 (Ga. Ct. App. 1980)). 
 42. Howard v. GMAC Mortg., LLC, 739 S.E.2d 453, 455 (Ga. Ct. App. 2013) (holding that 
wrongful foreclosure is not a defense to a dispossessory proceeding); Racette v. Bank of Am., N.A., 733 
S.E.2d 457, 464–65 (Ga. Ct. App. 2012) (holding that equitable relief in the form of a foreclosure sale’s 
cancellation is an appropriate remedy for wrongful foreclosure). 
 43. O.C.G.A. § 44-7-54(a) (2010). 
In any case where the issue of the right of possession cannot be finally determined 
within two weeks from the date of service of the copy of the summons and the 
7
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defendants may appeal any dispossessory judgment provided that the 
defendant pays rent into the registry until the issue has been 
determined on appeal.44 Failure to pay rent into the registry rids a 
defendant of the right to remain in possession; however, the court 
must still determine appropriate issues, because the court may restore 
possession to a defendant or appellant if the adjudicated issues 
warrant.45 
However limited defendants’ options in dispossessory actions are, 
property owners face a number of hardships as well. If the defendant 
does not answer, O.C.G.A. § 44-7-53(a) allows the court to issue a 
writ of possession without a jury trial, any further evidence, or any 
hearings.46 Here, the plaintiff is entitled to a default judgment much 
like in any other civil action, only much more quickly.47 A plaintiff in 
                                                                                                                 
copy of the affidavit, the tenant shall be required to pay into the registry of the 
trial court: (1) All rent and utility payments which are the responsibility of the 
tenant payable to the landlord under terms of the lease which become due after 
the issuance of the dispossessory warrant, said rent and utility payments to be 
paid as such become due . . . ; and (2) All rent and utility payments which are the 
responsibility of the tenant payable to the landlord under terms of the lease 
allegedly owed prior to the issuance of the dispossessory warrant; provided, 
however, that, in lieu of such payment, the tenant shall be allowed to submit to 
the court a receipt indicating that payment has been made to the landlord. 
Id. “If the tenant should fail to make any payment as it becomes due pursuant to paragraph (1) or (2) of 
subsection (a) of this Code section, the court shall issue a writ of possession and the landlord shall be 
placed in full possession of the premises by the sheriff, the deputy, or the constable.” 
O.C.G.A. § 44-7-54(b) (2010). 
 44. O.C.G.A. § 44-7-56 (2010). 
If the judgment of the trial court is against the tenant and the tenant appeals this 
judgment, the tenant shall be required to pay into the registry of the court all sums 
found by the trial court to be due for rent in order to remain in possession of the 
premises. The tenant shall also be required to pay all future rent as it becomes due 
into the registry of the trial court pursuant to paragraph (1) of subsection (a) 
of [§] 44-7-54 until the issue has been finally determined on appeal. 
Id. 
 45. Thomas, 409 S.E.2d at 74. 
Even if tenants have not paid rent into court and have consequently lost 
possession pending trial . . . or pending appeal . . . possession of the premises may 
still be restored to them when the issues are tried or considered on their merits on 
appeal. That is why the fact that appellee is in physical possession of the premises 
does not render moot the question of its ultimate legal right to that possession. 
Id. 
 46. O.C.G.A. § 44-7-53(a) (2010). “If the tenant fails to answer . . . the court shall issue a writ of 
possession . . . . The court, without the intervention of a jury, shall not require any further evidence nor 
hold any hearings and the plaintiff shall be entitled to a verdict and judgment by default . . . .” Id. 
 47. O.C.G.A. § 44-7-51(b) (2010). “The summons served on the defendant pursuant to subsection 
8
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a dispossessory proceeding may obtain an enforceable judgment 
within fourteen days, whereas a plaintiff in a civil suit will typically 
do so in fifty-five days.48 However, if the defendant does 
answer, § 44-7-53(b) requires a “trial of the issues.”49 Thus, a court 
must conduct a trial even if a defendant answers and presents no 
evidence of any genuine issue.50 Though § 44-7-53 provides that 
“every effort should be made by the trial court to expedite a trial of 
the issues,” property owners are still left subject to the scheduling 
availabilities of the courts, more attorneys’ fees, and further expenses 
of time and effort before the court may issue a judgment.51 Further, 
such a trial may be necessary even when a defendant has presented 
no evidentiary basis with which to dispute any of the plaintiff’s 
claims.52 
Thus, Georgia dispossessory proceedings currently occupy a 
middle ground that often denies either party an entirely appropriate 
remedy. A defendant who knows the plaintiff holds invalid title 
through a wrongful foreclosure has no ability to remain in possession 
of the property while proving the claim.53 Even if a defendant 
successfully defends or appeals, he must unequivocally pay rent into 
the court registry without regard for whether a plaintiff’s alleged 
                                                                                                                 
(a) of this Code section shall command and require the tenant to answer either orally or in writing within 
seven days from the date of the actual service . . . .” Id. § 44-7-53(a) provides that the court shall issue a 
writ of possession “notwithstanding Code Section 9-11-55 or Code Section 9-11-62.” 
O.C.G.A. § 44-7-53(a) (2010). The former allows default judgment for the plaintiff fifteen days after the 
defendant’s failure to answer within the time required, which is generally thirty days. 
O.C.G.A. § 9-11-12, -55 (2015). The latter provides that “[n]o execution shall issue upon a judgment 
nor shall proceedings be taken for its enforcement until the expiration of ten days after its entry.” 
O.C.G.A. § 9-11-62 (2015). 
 48. O.C.G.A. §§ 44-7-52(b) to -53(a); §§ 9-11-12 to -55, -62. 
 49. O.C.G.A. § 44-7-53(b) (2010). 
If the tenant answers, a trial of the issues shall be had in accordance with the 
procedure prescribed for civil actions in courts of record except that if the action 
is tried in the magistrate court the trial shall be had in accordance with the 
procedures prescribed for that court. 
Id. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. 
 52. See id. 
 53. Hurt v. Nw. Mortg., Inc., 580 S.E.2d 580, 586 (Ga. Ct. App. 2003) (“A challenge to the validity 
of foreclosure in defense of a dispossessory proceeding will not lie.”); Bellamy v. Fed. Deposit Ins. 
Corp., 512 S.E.2d 671, 675 (Ga. Ct. App. 1999) (“After foreclosure sale, the former owner cannot attack 
dispossession without first setting aside the foreclosure and deed.”). 
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wrongdoings have thwarted defendant’s ability to do so.54 
Conversely, a defendant may answer a dispossessory action with 
empty allegations and no evidentiary basis, yet a plaintiff may not 
obtain relief through any summary judgment, and the court must 
schedule and conduct a trial of the issues in full accordance with civil 
procedures.55 A solution that, when necessary, (1) better equips 
defendants to legitimately challenge dispossessory actions and (2) 
provides property owners with appropriately swifter remedies would 
allow courts to conduct either a full and fair trial or none at all, thus 
providing as complete a remedy as possible to the deserving party. 
II.   ANALYSIS 
Georgia’s current dispossessory scheme provides defendants with 
fewer available defenses than Georgia’s legislative and common law 
history seem to warrant.56 Dispossessory proceedings’ rent 
requirement can cause defendants amplified harms; however, the 
requirements do serve a vital function for plaintiffs.57 Defendants’ 
available defenses and rent requirements are particularly harmful 
considering dispossession’s equitable harms and their relativity to 
plaintiffs’ potential damages from stays.58 Despite dispossessory 
proceedings streamlining its process at defendants’ expense, the 
dispossessory scheme still does not provide plaintiffs with summary 
judgment when defendants present no potentially valid claims.59 
A.   Defendants: Available Defenses and Rent Requirement 
1.   Available Defenses 
Georgia common law history reflects a dispossessory scheme that 
would likely allow expanded defenses. Georgia courts, such as the 
                                                                                                                 
 54. O.C.G.A. §§ 44-7-54 to -56 (2010). 
 55. O.C.G.A. § 44-7-53(b). 
 56. See discussion infra Part II.A.1. 
 57. See discussion infra Part II.A.2. 
 58. See discussion infra Part II.A.3. 
 59. See discussion infra Part II.B. 
10
Georgia State University Law Review, Vol. 32, Iss. 4 [2016], Art. 7
https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr/vol32/iss4/7
2016] GEORGIA DISPOSSESSORY PROCEEDINGS 1013 
court of appeals in Bellamy v. FDIC, cite settled common law that “it 
is not germane to a dispossessory proceeding to allege that a contract 
under which the plaintiff claims to derive title from the defendant is 
void and should be canceled.”60 Cases as recent as Howard v. GMAC 
Mortgage, LLC, decided in March 2013, cite this phrase from 
Bellamy as denying a defendant the ability to assert wrongful 
foreclosure and similar claims as defenses to dispossessory 
proceedings.61 Bellamy draws this quotation from Womack v. 
Columbus Rentals, which quoted the rule from Crawford v. 
Crawford, a 1913 Georgia Supreme Court case that denied a 
defendant in a dispossessory proceeding the defense that the contract 
under which the plaintiff derived title was void.62 In fact, all Georgia 
cases citing precedent that wrongful foreclosure is not an appropriate 
defense in a dispossessory proceeding eventually trace to Bellamy 
and thus to Crawford.63 Crawford supports its decision by citing 
Patrick v. Cobb and Brown v. Bonds, the latter of which cites the 
former.64 Patrick, in turn, cites Johnson v. Stancliffe, which denied its 
dispossessory defendant the defense that the plaintiff allegedly 
claimed title under a void deed that was given to secure debt “at 
                                                                                                                 
 60. Bellamy v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., 512 S.E.2d 671, 674 (Ga. Ct. App. 1999). 
 61. E.g., Howard v. GMAC Mortg., LLC, 739 S.E.2d 453, 455 (Ga. Ct. App. 2013); Vines v. 
LaSalle Bank Nat’l Ass’n, 691 S.E.2d 242, 243 (Ga. Ct. App. 2010); Jackman v. LaSalle Bank, N.A., 
683 S.E.2d 925, 927 (Ga. Ct. App. 2009). 
 62. Crawford v. Crawford, 77 S.E. 557 (Ga. 1913); Womack v. Columbus Rentals, Inc., 478 S.E.2d 
611, 614 (Ga. Ct. App. 1996) (“It is not germane to a dispossessory proceeding to allege ‘that a contract 
under which the plaintiff claims to derive title from the defendant is void and should be canceled.’” 
(quoting Crawford, 77 S.E. at 557)). 
 63. E.g., Jackman, 683 S.E.2d at 927 (citing Hurt v. Nw. Mortg., Inc., 580 S.E.2d 580, 586 (Ga. Ct. 
App. 2003) (citing Solomon v. Nw. Mortg. Corp., 538 S.E.2d 783, 784 (Ga. Ct. App. 2000) (citing 
Bellamy, 512 S.E.2d 671, 674 (citing Crawford, 77 S.E. 557)))); Owens v. Green Tree Servicing LLC, 
684 S.E.2d 99 (Ga. Ct. App. 2009) (citing Hague v. Kennedy, 423 S.E.2d 283 (Ga. Ct. App. 1992) 
(citing Ryals v. Atl. Life Ins. Co., 186 S.E. 197 (Ga. Ct. App. 1936) (citing Crawford, 77 S.E. 557))). 
 64. Crawford, 77 S.E. at 557–58 (“The scope of this amendment is to allege that a written contract, 
under which the plaintiff claims to derive title from him, is void and should be canceled. Such an 
amendment is not germane to the issue made by the filing of a counter affidavit to a summary 
proceeding to eject a tenant. There was no error in disallowing the amendment and in excluding 
evidence in support of it.” (citations omitted)); Brown v. Bonds, 54 S.E. 933, 935 (Ga. 1906) (“As 
defendant in the rent and supply lien foreclosure suits, petitioner could only set up such equitable 
defense as would be germane to that which she might allege by way of counter affidavit; she could not 
engraft on her statutory defense an amendment praying a cancellation of her deed to the plaintiff.” 
(citing Patrick v. Cobb, 49 S.E. 806 (Ga. 1905))). 
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usurious rates of interest.”65 Johnson points to Ray v. Home & 
Foreign Investment & Agency Company, an 1899 Georgia Supreme 
Court case that did not involve a dispossessory proceeding.66 Ray 
defined the appropriate parameters of a “cross bill” response to a 
claim for equitable relief.67 Ray found that the defendant had 
submitted an appropriate cross bill which was “germane to the case 
made by the original petition.”68 Thus, in 1899, Ray began a lineage 
of common law that, by Bellamy, had developed into a doctrine that a 
dispossessory defense must be “germane” to the dispossessory 
proceedings and reached as far as Howard in 2013.69 
However, Ray seems to outline a definition of “germane” that 
would include modern counterclaims such as wrongful foreclosure. 
Ray cites Josey v. Rogers and McDougald v. Dougherty—both pre-
1860 cases that do not cite a previous case—and § 399 of the 1892 
edition of Story’s Equity Pleading.70 This body of authority defines a 
cross bill as “being generally considered as a defence [sic] to the 
original bill, or as a proceeding necessary to a complete 
determination of a matter already in litigation”;71 an ancillary suit, 
                                                                                                                 
 65. Patrick, 49 S.E. at 806 (“But, the proceeding being statutory, the defendant cannot by counter 
affidavit inject into the case an issue which is not germane to that involved in the proceeding.); Johnson 
v. Stancliffe, 39 S.E. 296, 296 (Ga. 1901) (“The defense thereby sought to be interposed was, in 
substance, as follows: The association claimed title under a deed from one Alice J. Mehaffey, given to it 
to secure loans made to her at usurious rates of interest, and such deed was, therefore, void.”). 
 66. Johnson, 39 S.E. at 297 (referencing generally Ray v. Home & Foreign Inv. & Agency Co., 32 
S.E. 603 (Ga. 1899)). 
 67. Ray, 32 S.E. at 605. 
 68. Id. 
 69. See id. See also Howard v. GMAC Mortg., LLC, 739 S.E.2d 453, 455 (Ga. Ct. App. 2013); 
Bellamy v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., 512 S.E.2d 671, 674 (Ga. Ct. App. 1999). 
 70. Ray, 32 S.E. at 605 (“‘A cross bill should not introduce new and distinct matters not embraced in 
the original suit.’ ‘A cross bill is a bill brought by a defendant against a complainant or other parties in a 
former bill depending, touching the matters in question in that bill.’ . . . ’It is treated, in short, as a mere 
ancillary suit, or as a dependency upon the original suit.’” (quoting Josey v. Rogers, 13 Ga. 478 (1853); 
McDougald v. Dougherty, 14 Ga. 674 (1854); Story, Eq. Pl. § 399)). These sources to which Ray cites 
all occurred before Georgia created America’s first comprehensive code in 1860, which first codified 
Georgia’s dispossessory scheme. Jefferson James Davis, The Georgia Code of 1863: America’s First 
Comprehensive Code, 4 J.S. LEGAL HIST. 1, 1 (1995) (“In 1860 Georgia enacted the first comprehensive 
code in the United States. That code went into effect January 1, 1863.”). 
 71. JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON EQUITY PLEADINGS, AND THE INCIDENTS THEREOF, 
ACCORDING TO THE PRACTICE OF THE COURTS OF EQUITY OF ENGLAND AND AMERICA 373 (10th ed. 
1892). 
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“or . . . a dependency upon the original suit”;72 and a claim that 
“should not introduce new and distinct matters not embraced in the 
original suit.”73 These definitions of an appropriate cross bill mirror 
current definitions of compulsory counterclaims, which arise “out of 
the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the 
opposing party’s claim.”74 
Claims such as wrongful foreclosure are compulsory 
counterclaims in dispossessory proceedings.75 Bellamy provides that 
“[a]ny attack on the foreclosure and the deed . . . had to be brought as 
a compulsory counterclaim to set aside the foreclosure deed.”76 In 
Bellamy, the court of appeals cites O.C.G.A. § 9-11-13(a), which 
deems counterclaims that arise “out of the transaction or occurrence 
that is the subject matter of the opposing party’s claim” 
compulsory.77 Thus, claims such as wrongful foreclosure are so 
connected to a dispossessory proceeding that those claims must be 
adjudicated within the same action, yet defendants are unable to use 
those claims as defenses to the dispossessory proceeding itself.78 In 
fact, Brown v. Bonds—a 1906 Georgia Supreme Court case on which 
Crawford relies—states that “when the court of equity takes 
jurisdiction for one purpose, it holds it for all others necessary to the 
final settlement of all questions involved in the litigation between the 
parties growing out of and connected with that subject-matter.”79 
Indeed, “equity seeks always to do complete justice.”80 
Georgia courts legitimize these compulsory counterclaims’ 
exclusion from dispossessory defenses by reasoning that “claimed 
defects in the landlord’s title to premises cannot be raised as a 
                                                                                                                 
 72. Id. 
 73. Josey, 13 Ga. at 478. 
 74. O.C.G.A. § 9-11-13(a) (2015). 
 75. See Bellamy v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., 512 S.E.2d 671, 674 (Ga. Ct. App. 1999). 
 76. Id. 
 77. O.C.G.A. § 9-11-13(a); see Bellamy, 512 S.E.2d at 674. 
 78. Bellamy, 512 S.E.2d at 674 (holding both that wrongful foreclosure is not a defense to a 
dispossessory proceeding and that defendants must bring claims such as wrongful foreclosure as 
counterclaims in dispossessory proceedings lest res judicata later bar them). 
 79. Brown v. Bonds, 54 S.E. 933, 935 (Ga. 1906) (quoting Clay v. Banks, 71 Ga. 363, 374 (1883)). 
 80. O.C.G.A. § 23-1-7 (1982). §23-1-7 continues that “[h]ence, having the parties before the court 
rightfully, it will proceed to give full relief to all parties in reference to the subject matter of the action, 
provided the court has jurisdiction for that purpose.” Id. 
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defense”81 and—specifically regarding wrongful foreclosure—that 
“[t]he purchaser at a foreclosure sale under a power of sale in a 
security deed is the sole owner of the property until and unless the 
sale is set aside.”82 However, a valid wrongful foreclosure claim 
would destroy a plaintiff’s title as entirely as a valid allegation of a 
fraudulent deed or any other appropriate dispossessory defense.83 A 
plaintiff who fraudulently manufactured a deed is no less deserving 
of title, nor of landlord status over the defendant, than a plaintiff who 
committed fraud in the property’s foreclosure, especially in the 
context of an expedited trial.84 The issue in a dispossessory 
proceeding is “tenancy or no tenancy;” however, this issue’s clarity is 
as dependent on claims such as wrongful foreclosure as it is on 
whether a deed is fraudulent.85 
Further, dispossessory laws were quite different when nineteenth 
and early twentieth century courts created the common law from 
which Georgia courts now draw the narrow definition of 
dispossessory defenses. Plaintiffs stood to lose much more from a 
drawn-out dispossessory proceeding under this law than plaintiffs 
now stand to lose. Particularly, Georgia legislators overhauled 
dispossessory proceedings and enacted O.C.G.A. § 44–7–54 in 
1970—in addition to many other sections of the current 
dispossessory scheme—providing for defendant’s payment of rent 
into the court registry during trial and proper disbursement after 
                                                                                                                 
 81. Hague v. Kennedy, 423 S.E.2d 283, 286 (Ga. Ct. App. 1992) (citing Ryals v. Atl. Life Ins. Co., 
186 S.E. 197 (Ga. Ct. App. 1936)). 
 82. Bellamy, 512 S.E.2d at 674. 
 83. FRANK S. ALEXANDER ET AL., GEORGIA REAL ESTATE FINANCE AND FORECLOSURE LAW § 8:11 
(database updated Oct. 2014). 
 Successful actions at law for damages resulting from wrongful 
foreclosure are possible, though proof of damages is difficult when the 
foreclosure is set aside as a matter of equity. 
 . . . . 
 . . . The debtor may seek either to set aside the foreclosure or to 
recover damages for the value of the property, but not both. 
Id. 
 84. O.C.G.A. § 44-7-53(b) (2010) (“Every effort should be made by the trial court to expedite a trial 
of the issues.”). 
 85. Hamilton v. Darden, 198 S.E. 805, 805 (Ga. Ct. App. 1938) (“An issue made by the filing of a 
counter-affidavit to a dispossessory warrant is tenancy or no tenancy, and the question of the plaintiff’s 
title is not involved.”). 
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trial.86 Before 1970, the Georgia dispossessory scheme was near 
untouched since the nineteenth century.87 Specifically, § 61–303 
provided defendants only the defense that they either (a) were tenants 
but were not holding possession beyond a lease term or (b) were not 
holding possession at all from the plaintiff or anyone else.88 If 
defendants provided such a defense to “arrest the proceedings,” law 
also required that they “tender a bond with good security, payable to 
the landlord, for the payment of such sum, with costs, as may be 
recovered against him on the trial of the case.”89 What plaintiffs 
could recover against defendants was “double the rent reserved or 
stipulated to be paid,” not including until 1947 double rent during 
and after trial until tenant delivered possession.90 Thus, pre-1970 law 
provided neither an avenue for defendants to remain in possession 
without paying double the backed rent claimed by the plaintiff 
upfront nor a way for the proceedings to continue without plaintiffs 
losing any rent over the bond amount which might accrue during the 
proceedings until at least 1947. Currently, Georgia law provides both, 
yet appropriate defenses in common law still reflect a nineteenth-
century body of law under which claims such as wrongful foreclosure 
severely threatened plaintiffs’ financial interests.91 
                                                                                                                 
 86. S.B. 250, 109th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ga. 1970). 
An Act to amend the Code Chapter 61-3, relating to proceedings against tenants 
holding over, . . . . so as to provide for . . . tenant’s remaining in possession 
during the litigation; to provide for payment of rent; to provide for payment or 
accounting to the court for back rent allegedly owed; as it becomes due into court 
during the litigation, to provide for disbursement of the rent money paid into 
court. 
Id. This Act struck entirely and rewrote §§ 61–302, -303, -304, -305, and -306, and their replacements 
are now O.C.G.A. §§ 44-7-51, -53, -54, -55, and -56, respectively. O.C.G.A. §§ 44-7-51, -53, -54, -55, 
-56 (2010); S.B. 250. 
 87. Ga. Code Ann. §§ 61-302 to -306 (West 1981). Before 1970, § 61-302 had last been amended in 
1896, § 61-303 in 1866, § 61-304 not since its creation in 1827, § 61-305 in 1947 (providing for 
additional double rent until tenant delivered possession after judgment against tenant), and § 61-306 in 
1957 and 1968 (both regarding notice to tenant). Ga. Code Ann. §§ 61-302 to -306 (West 1981); S.B. 3, 
86th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ga. 1947); H.B. 63, 96th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ga. 1957); H.B. 
911, 107th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ga. 1968). 
 88. Code of Ga. of 1933, § 61-303 (repealed 1970). 
 89. Id. 
 90. Code of Ga. of 1933, § 61-305 (repealed 1970); S.B. 3, 86th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ga. 
1947) (“[S]uch judgment shall also provide for the payment of future double rent until the tenant 
surrenders possession of the lands of tenements to the landlord after an appeal or otherwise . . . .”). 
 91. O.C.G.A. §§ 44-7-54, -56 (2010). 
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Thus, Georgia law has continued since the nineteenth century to 
recognize the inseparable nature of the dispossessory proceeding 
itself and counterclaims attacking the validity of a dispossessory 
plaintiff’s title, but the connection that created this inseparability has 
not retained its logical necessity that “both causes may be heard 
together, and one decree cover both.”92 Surely a counterclaim that (1) 
no longer poses as severe a threat to plaintiffs and (2) shares enough 
subject matter with a dispossessory proceeding that defendants must 
assert that counterclaim in the same action warrants full adjudication 
of that shared subject matter before defendants lose possession of the 
property entirely. 
2.   Rent Requirement 
Even if defendants do present an appropriate defense, they must 
pay rent into the registry of the court pending resolution.93 This rent 
requirement does not account for defendants whose counterclaims’ 
underlying allegations may deprive defendants of their ability to pay 
rent.94 The downtown Atlanta homeless shelter—even considering an 
effective stay of the dispossessory action while the parties 
adjudicated title validity—could not pay rent into the registry 
because of the alleged actions underlying the shelter’s 
counterclaims.95 Thus, an alleged action that wrongfully deprived a 
defendant of possessory rights may also deprive the defendant of the 
ability to adjudicate that very wrongful action without first losing 
possession. 
Dispossessory proceedings’ rent requirement serves an important 
function for plaintiffs. Without the requirement, plaintiffs risk 
                                                                                                                 
 92. McDougald v. Dougherty, 14 Ga. 674, 674 (1854). “A cross-bill is a bill brought by a defendant 
against a complainant or other parties in a former bill depending, touching the matters in question in that 
bill. And the bill should be so framed, that both causes may be heard together, and one decree cover 
both.” Id. 
 93. O.C.G.A. §§ 44-7-53, -54 (2010). 
 94. See id. 
 95. Land, supra note 6 (“Since the Task Force is unable to pay any ‘substantive rent,’ [Task Force’s 
attorney] wrote, it will inevitably be forced out unless [the judge] relieves that requirement until the 
entire case can go to trial.”). 
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significant financial losses both during and after trial.96 Unlike the 
losses plaintiffs suffer from expanded defenses—which plaintiffs 
will, because of the rent requirement, but later regain if plaintiffs 
prevail at trial—the losses plaintiffs suffer in the absence of a rent 
requirement are permanent.97 If defendants cannot pay rent during 
trial—whatever the cause—defendants certainly will not be able to 
pay arrears, additional damages, or both if the plaintiff prevails at 
trial. Thus, rent requirements importantly prevent defendants from 
living essentially rent-free for as long as they are able to draw out a 
dispossessory proceeding.98 
3.   The Importance of Possession 
Defendants are able to adjudicate remaining claims after a court 
grants a writ of possession to the plaintiff.99 As the court of appeals 
noted in Wells Fargo, “possession of the premises may still be 
restored to [defendants] when the issues are tried or considered on 
their merits on appeal.”100 However, the negative effects of 
defendants losing possessory rights are difficult to later restore, 
especially relative to the effects on plaintiffs of a dispossessory 
proceeding’s stay until counterclaims’ adjudication. 
The most severe effects on defendants include suspension of 
housing benefits and threat of homelessness.101 Evicted tenants often 
lose government housing subsidies that contribute heavily to their 
ability to obtain housing.102 When consumer reports reflect an 
eviction, even more financially stable tenants face issues obtaining 
                                                                                                                 
 96. Land, supra note 4 (quoting the homeless shelter’s landlord’s attorney as stating that, while the 
court allowed the shelter to adjudicate its claims without paying rent into the court registry, “the 
[shelter] continues to live rent-free in [plaintiff’s] property, in which [plaintiff] has real dollars 
invested . . . , [so] [r]ight now, the [shelter] has a court-sanctioned free-ride on rent, insurance, taxes and 
utilities, to the detriment of [plaintiff] and indeed to others who have to pick up the tab.”). 
 97. See O.C.G.A. § 44-7-54 (2010) (“That part of the funds which is a matter of controversy in the 
litigation shall remain in the registry of the court until a determination of the issues by the trial court.”). 
 98. See, e.g., Land, supra note 4. 
 99. Thomas v. Wells Fargo Credit Corp., 409 S.E.2d 71, 74 (Ga. Ct. App. 1991). 
 100. Id. 
 101. Spector, supra note 12, at 415. 
 102. Id. at 415–17. 
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replacement housing, insurance, or even employment.103 Further, 
these threats may extend far beyond tenants themselves when tenant 
organizations and businesses provide community services.104 
Atlanta’s largest homeless shelter—according to its director—faced 
leaving hundreds of homeless Georgians with “nowhere to go.”105 
Since 1970, plaintiffs, especially if defendants are able to pay rent 
into the court registry, risk only timely payment.106 Plaintiffs likely 
even receive interest and further litigation-related damages if the trial 
concludes in their favor.107 Thus, plaintiffs risk a relatively fungible 
harm from a delay of their possessory rights, but reinstating 
defendants’ lost possessory rights after trial hardly negates the 
interim effects on defendants. 
B.   Plaintiff: Summary Judgment 
O.C.G.A. § 44-7-53(b) requires a “trial of the issues” if the 
defendant answers the summons.108 Though defendants have no right 
to a trial by jury in dispossessory proceedings, § 44-7-53(b) provides 
at least a bench trial.109 Although “every effort should be made by the 
trial court to expedite a trial of the issues,” property owners are 
subject to the scheduling availabilities of the courts, more attorneys’ 
                                                                                                                 
 103. Id. 
 104. See Cook, supra note 1. 
 105. Id. (“Without the Peachtree-Pine shelter, Beatty says, the homeless she serves will have nowhere 
to go.”). 
 106. O.C.G.A. § 44-7-54(c) (2010). 
That part of the funds which is a matter of controversy in the litigation shall 
remain in the registry of the court until a determination of the issues by the trial 
court. If either party appeals the decision of the trial court, that part of the funds 
equal to any sums found by the trial court to be due from the landlord to the 
tenant shall remain in the registry of the court until a final determination of the 
issues. The court shall order the clerk to pay to the landlord without delay the 
remaining funds in court and all payments of future rent made into court pursuant 
to paragraph (1) of subsection (a) of this Code section unless the tenant can show 
good cause that some or all of such payments should remain in court pending a 
final determination of the issues. 
Id. 
 107. See id. 
 108. O.C.G.A. § 44-7-53(b) (2010). 
 109. See id.; West v. Veterans Admin., 357 S.E.2d 121, 122 (Ga. Ct. App. 1987) (holding that 
“[t]here is no right to trial by jury in a summary dispossessory action”), abrogated by Hill v. Levenson, 
383 S.E.2d 110 (Ga. 1989). 
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fees, and further expenses of time and effort before the court issues a 
judgment.110 Such delay is especially unwarranted when a defendant 
presents no evidentiary bases with which to dispute the plaintiff’s 
claims.111 
Defendants must answer in only seven days, and therefore answers 
may contain only a fraction of the facts or counterclaims defendants 
may present later.112 However, a guaranteed trial is not entirely 
necessary to ensure full consideration of defendants’ allegations, 
since defendants may—and often do—amend their answer before 
trial to be more comprehensive than was possible within the initial 
seven day window.113 Courts therefore may determine the potential 
validity of a defendant’s case without holding a trial. Currently, a 
defendant may respond to a summons with an answer, which no court 
considers a possible defense—or to even concern the case or 
property—yet the court must conduct a trial.114 Dispossessory 
proceedings are meant to provide landlords with quick and efficient 
means of eviction when the situation warrants, yet dispossessory 
proceedings fail to provide landlords with the quickest means of 
judicial decision in situations which warrant it most: a summary 
judgment when defendants present no semblance of a triable 
matter.115 
III.   PROPOSAL 
Defenses to dispossessory actions should include compulsory 
counterclaims that, if valid, would legally destroy plaintiffs’ title.116 
If defendants wield expanded potential defenses, Georgia 
                                                                                                                 
 110. O.C.G.A. § 44-7-53(b) (2010). 
 111. See id. 
 112. O.C.G.A. § 44-7-51(b) (2010). 
 113. Cf. Foy v. McCrary, 121 S.E. 804 (Ga. 1924) (holding that an amendment to an answer to 
dispossessory summons is allowable to allege more specific facts under its theory of defense even after 
both parties have introduced their evidence at trial). 
 114. See O.C.G.A. § 44-7-53(b) (2010). 
 115. O.C.G.A. § 9-11-56(c) (2014) (providing for summary judgment without a trial when “there is 
no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of 
law”). 
 116. See discussion infra Part III.A.1. 
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dispossessory proceedings’ rent requirement is vital to the process’s 
integrity.117 Dispossessory proceedings should provide a property 
owner with a narrow avenue for summary judgment when a 
defendant’s response presents no matter for trial.118 
A.   For Defendants, Expand Defenses, but Retain Rent Requirement 
1.   Defenses 
Defenses to dispossessory actions should include compulsory 
counterclaims that, if valid, would legally destroy plaintiffs’ title. 
Such an expansion should include neither claims which, if valid, 
would destroy plaintiff’s title but do not have sufficient factual 
connection to the dispossessory proceeding, nor claims which have 
sufficient factual connections to the dispossessory proceedings but, if 
valid, would not destroy plaintiff’s title. Wrongful foreclosure may 
be the most likely counterclaim under this standard, but other 
responses may also pass this test and allow defendants to settle the 
action’s underlying facts before losing possession.119 
Requiring such claims be compulsory counterclaims would ensure 
that defenses are appropriately—indeed inseparably—connected to 
the factual matters in dispute in a dispossessory proceeding. 
Dispossessory proceedings’ Georgia common law history traces to 
the doctrine that cross-bills to equity claims must sufficiently relate 
to the matters at issue.120 Claims such as wrongful foreclosure are 
compulsory counterclaims in dispossessory proceedings: res judicata 
bars a defendant from later bringing such a claim in a separate action 
because the claim involves the same transaction as the dispossessory 
                                                                                                                 
 117. See discussion infra Part III.A.2. 
 118. See discussion infra Part III.B. 
 119. E.g., Crawford v. Crawford, 77 S.E. 557 (Ga. 1913) (written contract under which the plaintiff 
claimed to derive title allegedly obtained by fraud and therefore void); Sanders v. Daniel, 691 S.E.2d 
244, 246 (Ga. Ct. App. 2010) (defendant arguing that plaintiff’s title to the property was invalid because 
the company from which defendant bought the property had obtained an order quieting title from the 
Fulton County Superior Court, which lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the property, which was 
located in Monroe County). 
 120. See discussion supra Part II.A.1. 
20
Georgia State University Law Review, Vol. 32, Iss. 4 [2016], Art. 7
https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr/vol32/iss4/7
2016] GEORGIA DISPOSSESSORY PROCEEDINGS 1023 
claim.121 Thus, compulsory counterclaims logically meet the standard 
from which Georgia courts draw appropriate dispossessory defenses: 
that the claim must be “touching the matters in question.”122 
Requiring that the claims, if valid, legally destroy plaintiff’s title 
would ensure that defenses carry the same legal effect as current 
appropriate defenses: invalidation of the tenancy. Georgia courts 
currently state the issue in a dispossessory proceeding as “tenancy or 
no tenancy” and draw from that issue that “the question of the 
plaintiff’s title is not involved.”123 However, a plaintiff’s title must, 
to a certain degree, be involved in order to assure a defendant 
complete access to the issue of tenancy.124 Invalid title, however 
achieved, effectuates an invalid tenancy.125 
Further, expanded defenses under this standard would subject all 
claims involving the action’s subject matter to dispossessory 
proceedings’ “expedited trial.”126 Once a court issues a writ of 
possession, any remaining claims will likely continue as a normal 
civil action, not an action in which “[e]very effort should be made by 
the trial court to expedite a trial of the issues.”127 Thus, a defendant 
with a valid wrongful foreclosure or similar counterclaim who must 
adjudicate that claim after the court issues the writ is without 
                                                                                                                 
 121. Bellamy v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., 512 S.E.2d 671, 674 (Ga. Ct. App. 1999) (“[A]ny defect in 
the advertising of the foreclosure, conduct of sale, deed under power of sale, or other basis to set aside 
the foreclosure had to be asserted as a compulsory counterclaim or it becomes barred by res judicata.”); 
Trust Co. Bank of Nw. Ga. v. Shaw, 355 S.E.2d 99, 101 (Ga. Ct. App. 1987) (holding that res judicata 
would bar a prior dispossessory defendant from instituting a tort action for damages stemming from 
landlord’s failure to maintain premises because the dispossessory proceeding satisfied res judicata’s 
“same transaction” test). 
 122. Ray v. Home & Foreign Inv. & Agency Co., 32 S.E. 603, 605 (Ga. 1899) (“A cross bill is a bill 
brought by a defendant against a complainant or other parties in a former bill depending, touching the 
matters in question in that bill.”) (citing McDougald v. Dougherty, 14 Ga. 674 (1854)). 
 123. Jones v. Windham, 168 S.E. 6, 7 (Ga. 1933). 
 124. E.g., Egana v. HSBC Mortg. Corp., 669 S.E.2d 159, 161 (Ga. Ct. App. 2008) (holding that an 
allegedly fraudulent security deed was an appropriate defense); Wilbanks v. Arthur, 570 S.E.2d 664, 
665 (Ga. Ct. App. 2002) (holding that defendant’s mother allegedly acquiring title from plaintiff through 
adverse possession was an appropriate defense); Sanders, 359 S.E.2d at 398 (holding that the document 
between the parties allegedly being a sales contract, not a lease, was an appropriate defense). 
 125. O.C.G.A. § 44-7-50(a) (2010). § 44-7-50 provides that “the owner or the agent, attorney at law, 
or attorney in fact of the owner” may make the affidavit that commences a dispossessory action. Id. 
(emphasis added). 
 126. O.C.G.A. § 44-7-53(b) (2010). 
 127. Id. 
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possession longer—potentially much longer—than a plaintiff would 
be without possession if a defendant’s counterclaim is not valid and 
the court settles the claim before issuing the writ. This longer period 
without possession coupled with the severity of defendants’ harms 
from lack of possession, relative to plaintiffs’, leaves defendants with 
even more to lose.128 
Some courts may already recognize the claims’ inseparability, 
such as in the litigation between Metro Atlanta Task Force for the 
Homeless and its landlord.129 There, the court, after staying the 
dispossessory in order to settle the issue of title, allowed the shelter’s 
landlord to proceed with eviction only because the shelter was unable 
to pay rent.130 Regardless, Georgia dispossessory proceedings’ 
defenses are not statutory; courts may expand defenses with a shift in 
common law doctrine.131 
2.   Rent Requirement 
If defendants wield expanded potential defenses, Georgia 
dispossessory proceedings’ rent requirement is vital to the process’s 
integrity. If the pool of possible dispossessory defenses expands, trial 
lengths may increase.132 Georgia law cannot—and indeed does not—
leave plaintiffs with no assurance of payment during and after trial in 
such a situation.133 
                                                                                                                 
 128. See discussion supra Part II.A.3. 
 129. Land, supra note 6; Land, supra note 4; Greg Land, Judge Weighs Ordering Task Force to Pay 
Rent, Allowing Appeal, FULTON COUNTY DAILY REPORT (Sept. 14, 2014), http://www.dailyreport 
online.com/id=1202669784710/CORRECTED-Judge-Weighs-Ordering-Task-Force-to-Pay-Rent-
Allowing-Appeal?slreturn=20160210102448 [hereinafter Land, Ordering Task Force to Pay Rent] 
(“The [Georgia Supreme Court] justices said that the shelter already had an ‘adequate remedy at law’ to 
challenge the dispossessory, saying a plea in abatement can halt dispossessories while ‘substantially the 
same questions of title’ are resolved.”). 
 130. Land, Ordering Task Force to Pay Rent, supra note 129. 
 131. See discussion supra Part II.A.1. 
 132. O.C.G.A. § 44-7-53(b) (2010). Though dispossessory trial times may increase, total time spent 
adjudicating defendants’ counterclaims may well decrease, since the parties would likely still adjudicate 
many compulsory counterclaims, which would invalidate plaintiff’s title post-writ and therefore not in 
an expedited trial. Id. 
 133. O.C.G.A. § 44-7-54(c) (2010). 
The court shall order the clerk of the court to pay to the landlord the payments 
claimed under the rental contracts . . . provided, however, that, if the tenant claims 
that he or she is entitled to all or any part of the funds and such claim is an issue 
22
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The rent requirement causes plaintiffs to risk only timely payment 
if the court stays a dispossessory proceeding in order to adjudicate 
defendants’ defenses.134 Without dispossessory proceedings’ rent 
requirement, defendants may live rent-free for as long as they may 
prolong the proceeding.135 If courts provide defendants with 
expanded defenses, landlords are likely left with a financially 
insurmountable amount of unpaid rent after trial and no way to 
collect. Plaintiffs simply cannot operate at a financial loss while 
proving title. Even if a defendant may contest a plaintiff’s title and 
remain in possession during an expedited trial, Georgia law cannot 
presume that the plaintiff’s title is invalid until proven valid.136 
Tolling the rent requirement when defendants’ counterclaims 
allege plaintiff wrongdoings that have themselves left defendants 
unable to pay rent is unworkable, benefitting defendants during trial 
but threatening plaintiffs who prevail at trial with financial 
devastation.137 Especially if defendants are unable—rather than just 
unwilling—to pay rent pending adjudication, they will certainly be 
unable to pay arrears or further interim damages if the property 
                                                                                                                 
of controversy in the litigation, the court shall order the clerk to pay to the 
landlord without delay only that portion of the funds to which the tenant has made 
no claim . . . . That part of the funds which is a matter of controversy in the 
litigation shall remain in the registry of the court until a determination of the 
issues by the trial court. If either party appeals . . . any sums found by the trial 
court to be due from the landlord to the tenant shall remain in the registry of the 
court until a final determination of the issues. The court shall order the clerk to 
pay to the landlord without delay the remaining funds in court and all payments of 
future rent made . . . unless the tenant can show good cause that some or all of 
such payments should remain in court pending a final determination of the issues. 
Id. 
 134. See discussion supra Part II.A.3. 
 135. See, e.g., Land, supra note 4. 
 136. O.C.G.A. § 44-7-50 (2010); Rucker v. Fuller, 276 S.E.2d 600 (Ga. 1981); Henry v. Wild Pine 
Apartments, 340 S.E.2d 233 (Ga. Ct. App. 1986); Lamb v. Hous. Auth., 247 S.E.2d 597 (Ga. Ct. App. 
1978). Until trial, the court does hold more evidence of validity of a plaintiff’s titles than otherwise, 
since a plaintiff must commence a dispossessory proceeding with an affidavit of the facts and a 
defendant’s answer need not be supported by admissible evidence, if at all, until trial. § 44-7-50 (“If the 
tenant refuses or fails to deliver possession when so demanded, the owner may . . . make an affidavit 
under oath to the facts.”); Rucker, 276 S.E.2d at 602 (holding that what constitutes “answer” in a 
dispossessory proceeding is to be liberally construed); Henry, 340 S.E.2d at 234 (holding that a tenant’s 
answer to a dispossessory complaint need not be verified); Lamb, 247 S.E.2d at 598–99 (holding that a 
tenant’s answer need not meet the formalities required for other judicial proceedings but not expressly 
required for a dispossessory proceeding). 
 137. See discussion supra Parts II.A.2, 3. 
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owner prevails at trial. Even judicial balancing of plaintiffs’ financial 
harms from tolling rent and harms to and outside of defendants 
themselves, such as in the community, leaves plaintiffs in an 
unworkable financial situation. Landlord concern about such 
situations could even leave community-beneficial plaintiffs at 
economic disadvantages. 
The rent requirement requires defendants to invest in their 
defense’s validity and therefore lowers the likelihood of frivolous 
defenses while assuring defendants will not live rent-free for the 
duration of a court action and never be held responsible for plaintiffs’ 
interim financial losses. Thus, Georgia dispossessory proceedings’ 
current rent requirement is effective and vital to the integrity of the 
process, especially if defendants possess expanded defenses. 
B.   For Plaintiffs, Provide Summary Judgment138 
Dispossessory proceedings should provide property owners with a 
narrow avenue for summary judgment when defendants’ responses 
present no triable matter. Summary judgment in dispossessory 
proceedings should be much narrower than in other civil contexts. 
Since defendants must respond to summons within seven days, 
defendants often may not have enough time to present a complete set 
of facts or to research and advance legal arguments.139 Thus, courts 
cannot grant summary judgments unless courts first identify that 
defendants have presented the facts and arguments with which they 
                                                                                                                 
 138. For a proposed bill to provide summary dispossessory judgment in dispossessory proceedings, 
see H.B. 928, 152d Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ga. 2013). This bill does not explicitly provide for the 
high deference to defendants or assurance that defendants have presented the facts and arguments with 
which they intend to defend called for in infra Part III.B. The bill does reflect (1) a recognized need for 
summary dispossessory judgment in Georgia and (2) the unique practical considerations involved in 
summary dispossessory judgment, such as overnight delivery of the summary judgment motion and a 
shorter, five-day response window. H.B. 928, 152d Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ga. 2013). 
 139. O.C.G.A. § 44-7-51(b) (2010). 
The summons served on the defendant pursuant to subsection (a) of this Code 
shall command and require the tenant to answer . . . within seven days from the 
date of the actual service unless the seventh day is a Saturday, a Sunday, or a 
legal holiday, in which case the answer may be made on the next day which is not 
a Saturday, a Sunday, or a legal holiday. 
Id. 
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intend to defend against the dispossessory action.140 This 
identification may come most naturally at the expiration of the 
window for response to a plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment. 
Even when defendants have fully presented their assertions, courts 
must give dispossessory defendants a much higher level of deference 
than courts afford defendants in other civil contexts. Once again, 
courts cannot hold defendants who must answer in seven days to the 
same standards to which courts hold defendants who must answer in 
thirty days.141 However, a smaller time frame in which defendants 
must answer does not warrant a lack of pleading standards altogether 
or an absolute assurance of a trial in the event of any answer. Thus, 
while courts should not—as in other civil contexts—issue summary 
judgment for plaintiffs if the pleadings together show no genuine 
issue as to any material fact, courts may fairly issue summary 
judgment if a highly defendant-deferent evaluation of the pleadings 
shows no latent defenses or dormant material issues. 
Dispossessory proceedings’ streamlined process requires a certain 
amount of defendant deference to ensure that the process does not 
leave defendants unheard. However, an automatic trial for any 
answer overcompensates and leaves courts conducting trials of 
formality in which all issues are clear. Thus, a narrow summary 
judgment standard in which courts (1) ensure that defendants have 
presented a reasonable reflection of their arguments and (2) give 
                                                                                                                 
 140. O.C.G.A. § 9-11-56 (2014). Even with a higher level of deference to defendants than ordinary 
summary judgment, a summary judgment in a dispossessory proceeding must be sure not to leave 
defendants without opportunities to dispute the summary judgment that ordinary summary judgment 
gives; dispossessory proceedings’ streamlined nature may not provide time for response by affidavit 
and, most notably, a summary judgment hearing. Id. 
The motion shall be served at least 30 days before the time fixed for the hearing. 
The adverse party prior to the day of hearing may serve opposing affidavits . . . . 
When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported as provided in this 
Code section, an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials 
of his pleading, but his response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this 
Code section, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue 
for trial. If he does not so respond, summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be 
entered against him. 
§ 9-11-56(c)(e). 
 141. O.C.G.A. § 9-11-12 (2015) (“A defendant shall serve his answer within 30 days after the service 
of the summons and complaint upon him, unless otherwise provided by statute.”). 
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deference to potential latent issues for trial will spare plaintiffs the 
financial and temporal burdens of unnecessary trials. 
CONCLUSION 
Georgia dispossessory proceedings currently provide neither 
property owner plaintiffs nor tenant defendants with entirely fair 
relief.142 Current common law doctrine provides dispossessory 
defendants with fewer available defenses than Georgia legislative and 
common law history appears to warrant.143 Dispossessory 
proceedings’ statutory rent requirement, while serving a vital 
function for plaintiffs, can cause defendants amplified harms.144 
Defendants’ available defenses and rent requirements are particularly 
harmful considering dispossession’s equitable harms—those harms’ 
relativity to plaintiffs’ potential damages from stays, and defendants’ 
suffering those harms longer than plaintiffs.145 Though dispossessory 
proceedings disadvantage defendants for the sake of a streamlined 
process, the dispossessory scheme still requires a trial if defendants 
answer the summons, regardless of the answer’s content or whether it 
presents any triable matter.146 
Defenses to dispossessory actions should include compulsory 
counterclaims that would legally destroy plaintiffs’ title if valid.147 
Courts may create such an expansion through a shift in common law 
doctrine.148 If defendants wield expanded potential defenses, Georgia 
dispossessory proceedings’ rent requirement is vital to the process’s 
integrity.149 The harms that the rent requirement causes to certain 
defendants cannot overcome the destructive effects that tolling or 
balancing the rent requirement would cause to plaintiffs, especially if 
                                                                                                                 
 142. See discussion supra Part II. 
 143. See discussion supra Part II.A.1. 
 144. See discussion supra Part II.A.2. 
 145. See discussion supra Parts II.A.3, III.A.1. 
 146. See discussion supra Part II.B. 
 147. See discussion supra Part III.A.1. 
 148. See discussion supra Part III.A.1. 
 149. See discussion supra Part III.A.2. 
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courts avail defendants to broader defenses.150 Finally, dispossessory 
proceedings should provide property owners with a narrow avenue 
for summary judgment when defendants’ answers present no triable 
matter.151 Though much narrower than other summary judgments, 
such an option will at least rid plaintiffs of trials when no triable 
matter exists for a bench determination.152 
 
                                                                                                                 
 150. See discussion supra Part III.A.2. 
 151. See discussion supra Part III.B. 
 152. See discussion supra Part III.B. 
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